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Coe and Helpman (1995) have measured the extent to which technology spills over between
industrialized countries through the particular channel of trade flows, This paper re-examines two
particular features of their study. First, we suggest that their functional form of how foreign R&D
affects domestic productivity via imports is probably incorrect. We provide an alternative model
which turns out to be more accurate, both theoretically and empirically. Second, we take into
account two new potential channels of technology transfer: inward FDI and technology sourcing, as
proxied by outward FDI. The empirical results show that outward FDI flows and imports flows are
two simultaneous channels through which technology is internationally diffused. Inward FDI flows
are not a significant channel of technology transfer. The hypothesis of technology sourcing
associated with MNEs activities abroad is therefore confirmed while the widespread belief that
inward FDI is a major channel of technology transfer is rejected.
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and NBER BELGIUM1. INTRODUCTION
To what extent do the innovationsperformedin a partictiar country spill
overand benefit other countries?This questionwas the central concernof
Coe and Helpman (1995) who analyze the extent to which technological
activities diffuse between industrialized countries through the particdar
channel of trade flows. The objectiveof the presentpaper is to extendtheir
study towards a wider apprehension of the mechanisms underlying the
international difision of technology. In this respect, two spectilc features
are re-examined. First, we introduce a new fictional form of how foreign
R&D affects domestic productivity via import flows. This new model
appears to be more accurate, both theoretically and empirically. Second, we
put forward that trade is not the only channel through which technology
disseminates across countries. We suggest that both inward and outward
foreign direct investment (FDI) might be efficient channels for the
dissemination of technology across countries. We rely on Coe and
Helpman’s database to reestimatedand extend their model along these two
issues, The paper is orgtized as follows. The next section presents the new
methodolo~ and compares it with Coe and Helpman’s results, In section 3
inward and outward FDI are included in the empirical analysis as two
potential channels for the international ~sion of technology Section 4
concludes.
2, AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Coe and Helpman relate their empirical model to the theoretical models of
‘innovation-driven’ growth (see Grossman and Helpman (199l)). Their
objective is to assess how foreign technical advances contribute to improve
domestic productivity. More precisely, the idea is to evaluate the indirect
2benefits emanating from imports of goods and services that embody the
technological knowledge of trade partners. Their simplest equation has the
following form:
log~, =u: +ad log Sif+aJ logS,? +E,,, (1)
where i = 1,.., 22 is a coun~ index, CI! 0 is a country-spec~lc constant, ad
is the output elasticity of domestic R&D capital stock, a f is the output
elasticity of foreign R&D capital stock, &,Lis the error term, log F is the
logarithm of total factor productivity, Sd represents the domestic R&D
capital stock, and Sfi represents the foreign R&D capital stock defined as
the import-share-weighted average of the domestic R&D capital stocks of
trade partners:
(2)
where mu is the flow of imports of goods and services of country i from
country j (i # j ); mi. is the total imports of country i from its 21 trade
Paflners: m, . ~mg AS quoted by Coe and Helpman:
{{The specijcation of (I) may not capture adequately the role of
international trade. Although, the foreign stock of knowledge S@
consits of import weighted foreign R&D capital stocb, these weights
are fractions that add up to one and therefore do not properly rejlect
the level of imports. It might be expected that whenever two countries
have the same composition of imports and face the same composition
of R&D capital stocti among trade partners, the countiy that
imports more relative to its GDP may benejt more @om foreign
R&D. )). [P, 863]
Therefore, they put forward a modified spification of(1) that shodd take
into account the interaction between foreign R&D capital stocks and the
propensity to import:
3where ml is the total imports of country i and Yi is country i’s GDP1. Here
the elasticity of output witi respect to the foreign R&D capital stock equals
ctf (mi /Y,). This spectilcation seems to be very convenient since it allows
the elasticity to vary across countries in proportion to their import shares2,
There is however a theoretical drawback associated to the computation of the
foreign R&D capital stock: it is highly sensitive to a potential merger
between countries. Assume a world with three comtries, whit the following
GDPs (y) and domestic R&D capital stocks (r) for countries 2 and 3: y2 =
40, y3 = 40, r2 = 10, r3 = 20. Then, if country 1 imports 10 from
country 2 and 10 from country 3, its foreign R&D capital stock (f) should be
calculated as follows:
fl=;10+;20 =15
If we assume that countries 2 and 3 merge into one single country, the
foreign R&D capital stock of country 1 becomes (with the same trade flows
as before):
fl’=; .30=30
which is twice as large as the foreign R&D capital stock estimated from two
distinct countries. That is, the foreign MD capital stock estimated as in
equation 2 stiers from an aggregation bias. Why should the foreign R&D
‘ The use of total imports on GDP ratio overestimates thereal level of imports from industrialized
countries, In Japm for instance, the imports horn OPEC countries accounted for roughly twice the
imports from the United States during the eighties.
1 At this stage, Coe and Helpman make an analogy with macroeconomic studies to put their use of
import shares in contefi (cfi. foot note 3, p. 863). They are right in the sense that the studies of
teci-mological spillovers commonly seek a metric, such a.stechnological closeness in order to gauge
the intensity of spillovm (see Scherer (1982), and Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984), or Terleckyj
(1980) who rely on input-output flows or inter-iodustry twhnolo~cal flows matrices in order to
evaluate the degree of inter-industry R&D spillovers). In the context of international trade, this
analogy refers to specification(1), not to specti]cation (3).
4capital increase when countries merge? We suggest that what really matters
is the real R&D intensity embodied in the import flows of country i. In this
case, the foreign R&D capital stock should be computed as in spectilcation
(4), the imports of country i from country j being naturrdly embodied with
the MD intensity of country j:
mo,S;
log~1= a: + ffd logS; + af log~ —+ &;,’ (4)
j Yjf
where Yjl is country j‘s GDP. Then, the foreign R&D capital stock of
country 1would be:
Y1=:.10 +:.10=75
and after the merger between country 2 and country 3, the stock becomes:
~1, = (10+20)20=75
(40+40)
The ratio is unaffected by the reunflcation of the two counties3. A rational
test is to compare the explanatory power of spectilcations (1) and (3)
proposed by Coe and Helpman to the explanatory power of spectilcation (4).
However, the methodology used by Coe and Helpman in order to estimate
specification (3) may also be improved. The authors have transformed all
variables into index numbers (1985= 1) because TFP is measured in country
specific currencies whereas both R&D capital stocks are in constant 1985
US PPPs. The transforrnation of the TFP variable in index numbers is
legitimate, since it provides comparable series across countries; though the
authors cotid have relied on exchange rates (the same as those used for the
R&D variables) to transform the components of the total factor productivity
variable in constant 1985 US PPPs. The transformation of the R&D capital
stocks into index numbers may also be justtiable, though it is an
3 The ratio would be tieeted by the merger if country 2 and country 3 had different GDP levels;
however the difference would be msrginal as compared to the previous import shares methodolo~.
5unnecess~ procedure since they have been computed in a comparable
currency. In the case of specification (l), even if the dependent variable is
expressed in index numbers, it makes no differences to use the R&D
variables in index or in levels. Since the indexed variables are equal to the
levels variables divided by a constant (i.e. the 1985 value) for each country,
the fixed country effects of spectilcation (1) wotid incorporate the
denominators used to index each country’s R&D capital stocks. This maybe
illustrated as follows. Assume that S is the level of the foreign R&D capital
stock, then estimating its impact on TFP, as indexed 1985=1, is equivalent
to estimate this spectilcation:
which can be expressed as:
logq, =a:+a ‘ logS,f– a’ log si,*5
log q, = (a: - af logsi,85)+a’ logs,, ~
since all the components in parentheses are constant over time, the
estimated output elasticity of foreign R&D is not affected. Otiy the
estimated country specific constants will differ. In specification (3),
however, the estimated elasticities are not invariant with respect to
indexation. The authors multiply the import share to GDP ratio by the log of
the foreign R&D capital stock indexed for each country as 1985=1, Here,
this procedure would yield different results than with the level variables as
shown here under:
(5)
The third term can not be incorporated into the country specitic contants
because it is now time varying. Clearly, the estimate of af in eq. (5) would
6f in the original equation not in general be the same as the estimate of ~
(6).
log~, =a: +af ;logs,, (6)
This means that equation (3) would be misspecified by the transformation of
the foreign R&D capital stock variable in indices. The first two rows of table
1 (regressions (i) and (ii)) present the estimated parameters of specifications
(l), (3) as presented by Coe and Helpman, In the second part of table 1,
regressions (iii) and (iv) replicate the same estimations with our data, the
variables being also transformed in indices. Our database comes mainly
from Coe and Helpman’s appendix except the bilateral import flows from
1971 to 1990, which means that our results maybe slightly ditTerent. Then
the third part of table 1 shows the estimated parameters of specifications (l),
(3), and (4); all the R&D variables being expressed in levels. These three
regressions (v) to (vii) could be considered as being pardculti cases of the
following more general specification (7), in which the output elasticity of
domestic R&D is allowed to differ between G7 and other countries by
interacting the domestic R&D stock with a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1for G7 countries:
‘OgE=a’+ad’Ogs’+ a’G7’Ogs; ‘a’[tr’Og[z*l+’ ‘7)
Except for the G7 dummy variable, spectilcation (1) is equivalent to
spectilcation (7) with the parameters 8 ~ and 8 ~ constrained to zero and
6Z to one. In specification (3), only eg is set equal to zero. Specification
(4) corresponds to specification (7) with the parrunaters e, and ez
constrained to equal zero and e ~ to equal 1. In the last row of table 2,
regression (viii) presents the non linear estimates of spectilcation (7), which
aim at comparing spectilcations (1) and (4). This test should be helpfil to
7choose between total domestic imports and the GDP of the trade partners as
the best denominator in the computation of foreign R&D capital stocks.
Regressions (i) and (ii) are two basic specifications reported by Coe and
Helpman, where the impact of domestic R&D is allowed to differ between
the largest seven economies compared with the other 15 economies. As
expected, the parameters of regressions (iii) and (iv) are very close to the
parameters estimated by Coe and Helpman presented in (i) and (ii). We
attribute the very small variations to the different databases used for bilateral
import flows matrices. As observed by Coe and Helpman, the output
elasticities of domestic R&D capital stock have a value which correspond to
the values usually estimated for single country studies. However, the same
output elasticities are much higher for the G7 countries, well above the usual
estimates from single country studies. The coefficients of the foreign R&D
capital stock are significantly different from zero but vary substantially with
the spectilcations used.
Specification (1) yields an estimated output elasticity of foreign R&D equal
to 0,06 in both regressions (i) and (iii). The impact of the foreign R&D
capital stock is much stronger when it interacts with the share of imports in
GDP. The corresponding estimates of specifications (1) and (3) are provided
in regressions (v) and (vi), where the explanato~ variables are now
expressed in levels instead of indices. As expected from the previous
discussion, regression (v) yields exactly the same paameters as regression
(iii), which is estimated with the R&D variables expressed in indices.
4 The authors performed dtierent cointegration teats which appeared to yield conftiting results,
though the balance seemed to tilt towards the recognition that the equation were cointegrated.
However, they recognized that the econometrics of pooled cointegration are not yet fully worked out
and placed more emphasis on the a priori plausibility of the estimated parameti than on the teats
for cointegration(see Coe and Helpman (1995) p. 870).
8The problems lies with spectilcation (3), when it is estimated with the
foreign R&D capital stock as an index. Regression (vi) yields different
estimates than regression (iv), although the two specifications seem similar.
Further, with regression (vi) the estimated coefficient of the foreign R&D
capital stock is very small and is no longer sigtilcantly dtierent from zero,
This cotitrms our conjecture that the way spectilcation 3 estimates the
impact of foreign R&D capital stock on TFP is statistically rnisspecified. We
therefore turn to specification (4), which should characterize more properly
the concept of foreign R&D capital stock. Regression (vii) gives credence to
our supposition. The output elasticity of foreign R&D capital stock is equal
to 1l% and is highly significant. The adjusted R2 is much higher than with
any of the previous regressions, which means that our R&D spillover
variable allows for an improved approximation of the effect of foreign R&D
on domestic output.
Regression (viii) aims at comparing specification (1) to specification (4). In
other words, we want to test which variable -the GDP of the foreign country
j or the total imports of country i-is best suited to ‘scale’ the domestic R&D
capital stocks of the other countries. The parameter 6 ~ is not si@lcantly
different from zero, while e ~ is positive and not significantly different from
1, The restrictions imposed in regression (vii) are evidently not rejected by
the dati. That is, when computing a foreign R&D capitrd stock for country i,
the ratio of imports from country j to the GDP of country j is a more efficient
weight than the share of imports from country j in country i’s total impotts,
93. FDI: CHANNEL(S) OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER?
The second issue proposed in this paper is to extend Coe and Helpman’s
analysis by formaly taking into account other potential channels of
technology transfer. The traditional modes of international R&D tision -
foreign technology payments, foreign R&D investments, R&D joint
ventures- are obviously inter-related and typically closely associated to
MNE’s activities. This underlines the need to take inward FDI into account
in any attempt to measure international technological spillovers. Besides, a
vast body of empirical research leaves aside the technology sourcing
channel, though there is a strong evidence that the sourcing of foreign
knowledge is a genuine practice ftnrdy embodied in MNEs’ behaviourG.The
countries which are technological leaders have accumulated substantial
scientific and technological capacities. This technological endowments is
likely to be accessible to the foreign companies which setup production and
research facilities inside the technological leader’s boundaries. In this
respect, a good indicator of technology sourcing would be outward FDI
flows.
5 Vickery (1986) haa analysed the relative importance of foreign technology payments, foreign
R&D investments, and FDI. His main conclusions are that both the foreigo technology paymenk
and foreign R&D investments are relatively weak in the Prwess of international R&D spillovers, aa
compared to FDI.
b So fw, because of the scarcity of information, very few analyses have been able to test the
h~othesis of technology sourcing. me pioneer study has been realized by Kogut and Chang (1991)
about Japanese FDI in the United States. Their maio finding is ttrat Japanese direct investments in
tbe US is drawn to industries intensive in R&D. Furthermore, when the entries are diaa~egated by
mode (e.g. new plant or acquisition of equity) there is a sigrrttcant indication that joint venturm are
used for the sourcing and the sharing of US technological capabilities. With a similar anat~ical
apprO:cb Yamawaki (1993) fida that japanese frma enter the US and European marketsby
capturing existing local fm when Japanese parents suffer from a technological arrd/or comparative
disadvarrtage as compard to their US and European competitor. On the other han~ when Japanese
parenta possess technological or comparative advantages, they cho~ to invest in and to ~blish
new plank in the United States or Europe. Focusing on Europem industries, Neven and Siotis
(1992) observe that FDI flows from abroad tad to be higher in those sectors where European
technological iotenaity is higher than hat of other industrialized countries.
10The existing quantitative analysis of the impact of foreign technology on
domestic productivity growth may be classtiled into two broad categories.
On the one hand, a substantial amount of studies concentrate on the impact
of inward FDI on the productivity growth of host countries. A positive
impact is interpreted as being partly the results of technological tision but
these studies do not take into account any technological indicators and yield
conflicting results’. Technological spillovers are certairdy not automatic
consequences of inward FDI. On the other hand, some studies focus on the
impact of foreign technology on domestic productivity growth. They
consider that the technology is either non-embodied or embodied in traded
goods or technology payments. These studies also yield conflicting results,
depending on the country an~or the transfer channel considered.
Nevertheless, there is more evidence toward the recognition of international
R&D spilloverss. The main drawback of these studies on WD spillovers is
that they consider only one of the existing channels of R&D spillovers. FDI
flows have barely been examined econometrically in a multicountry
approach as a specific mean of technology transfer, though it is widely
accepted that they should play a substantial role in the international
diffusion of technology. The disadvantage of the studies which concentrate
on the impact of FDI on the host country productivity is that they fail to
7KOWO (1992) provides a comprehmive survey of this literature. Despite the fact tiat a positive
impact may be the result of different influences, most authors argue that if FDI benefit to the host
country, it is at least partly due to technOlOgical ~lfisiOn. However they dO nOt prOfide aoY
evidence about the relative importance of technology dfision. Caves (1974) classifies the
etimalities arising from FDI into three categories: the improvement of (i) allocative efficiency
(fewer monopolistic distortions), (ii) higher technical eficiency (a more efficient use of etiating
resources), and (iii) increaakg rates of technology tranafm. Therefore, any positive impact of FDI on
productivity groti dws not necessarily means that technolo~ transfer occurs between foreign
tidiates and local fm.
“ S= tie survey by Mohnen (1996). So far, the channels that have been used to memure tie tipact
of international R&D spillovers are foreign technology paymenb (Soete and Patel (1985) and
Mohnen and Gallant (1992)), disembedded’ R&D spillovm (Bernstein and Mohnen (1994)), and
trade flows (Coe and Helpman (1995)).
11distinguish the technological transfer component of this impact from the
other impact such as the increase in competition. In this section, our aim is
to take into account several channels of technology transfer, including the
technology that may spill over to other countries through FDI flows. In some
way, we reconcile the two different approaches by incorporating a
technological component into FDI flows.
In the light of the previous discussion, we hypothesize that both inward and
outward FDI flows may serve as channels of international technology
difision. Because FDI flows data are scarce over the period 1971-90, we
test this assumption for only 13 out of the original 22 countries covered in
the second section. The focus is now on a sample comprised by the USA,
Japan, and eleven European countries (Luxembourg being associated to
Belgium), We adopt the new specification proposed in this paper to
construct three different foreign R&D capital stocks. The first one, the
import-embodied foreign MD capital stock ( ~l!m) is constructed as in
equation (4), but with 13 countries. The foreign R&D embodied in inward
FDI is computed as follows:
(8)
where ~1 are the FDI flows of country j towards country i and kj is the
gross fixed capital formation of country j. In principle, it might be preferable
to speci~ FDI stocks as opposed to flows, but the construction or the use of
FDI stocks is rendered difficult by missing data and by the heterogeneous
methodologies adopted in different countries. The hypothesis of technology
sourcing is tested with the foreign R&D capital stock embodied in country
i’s outward FDI:
12(9)
where tti are the FDI flows of country i towards country j. The econometric
restits are presented in table 2; regressions (i) to (iii) show the estimated
output elasticities of each foreign WD capital stock, depending on the
assumed technology transfer channel. Regressions (iv) includes the
simultaneous effects of two variables.
The estimated elasticity of the domestic R&D capital stock is still positive,
signtilcant and substantially higher for the large countries. Regression (i)
includes the foreign R&D capital stock embodied in wade flows. Although
the focus is limited to 13 countries, the estimated output elasticity of the
foreign R&D variable (.117) is ve~ close to the estimates of regression (vii)
in table 1 (.109) performed with the 22 countries’ panel. Regarding the
impact of the R&D capital stock embodied in inward FDI, regression (ii)
shows that there is no significant international R&D spillovers. This
suggests that inward FDI does not yield substantial technology transfers
from the home country to the host country. This result maybe explained by
the fact that the MNEs’ aim when establishing subsidiaries abroad is
certainly not to contribute to international technology ~sion, but rather to
exploit more filly their own technological innovations.
In regression (iii), the output elasticity of the foreign R&D capital stock
embodied in outward FDI flows is positive and highly sigtilcant. That is,
the hypothesis of technology sourcing is cofilrmed by our estimates.
Through their investments abroad, m’s seem to be able to benefit from
13the foreign scientific base. Regression (iv) includes the foreign R&D capital
stock variables embodied in outward FDI and in imports simultaneously.
The output elasticities of the foreign R&D variables associated with outward
FDI and imports are both significant, their amplitudes are hardly affected
and the adjusted R-squared is higher than in the other three regressions,
reinforcing the robustness of our results.
The output elasticities of the domestic R&D capital stocks are much smaller
in regression (iv) than in regressions (i) to (iii). We may infer that not
properly taking into account the different channels of intemationti R&D
spillovers leads to upwardly biased estimates of the elasticity of output with
respect to domestic R&D capital stock. Average rates of return may be
obtained by dividing the estimated elasticities by the appropriate ratios of
R&D capital stocks to GDP. Our calculations @ased on the estimated
elasticities of regression (iv)) show that the average rates of return over the
period 1971-90 of domestic R&D capital stocks was 51 percent in the G7
countries and 63 percent in the remaining smaller countries. This means
that a $100 increase in the domestic R&D capital stock in a G7 country
raises its GDP by $51 while in one of the 7 smaller countries the GDP would
increase by $63. This restit is contradicting with Coe and Helpman’s study
who find a much higher rate of return on domestic R&D in the G7 comtries
than in the other smaller countries. Concerning the rate of return on foreign
R&D, the estimates suggest that a $100 increase in the foreign R&D capital
stock of country i would increase its GDP by $900 through import flows and
by $1470 through outward foreign direct investment. These very high values
are due to the way the foreign R&D capital stocks are constructed.
Relying on the elasticities estimated in regression (iv), we are now able to
compute two matrices of bilateral output elasticities of the domestic R&D
14performed by foreign countries. The country i’s output elasticity of country
j‘s domestic R&D capital stock maybe expressed as follows:
(lo)
and since the foreign R&D capital stock depends on the domestic R&D
capital stock of each other country:






a logs; yj s{
(11)
The estimated bilateral elasticities, for the two channels of R&D spillovers,
are presented in table 3. For instance, a one percent increase in the US R&D
capital stock raises the Japanese output by 0.07 percent through trade flows
and by 0.03 percent through the Japanese outward FDI in the USA. On the
other hand, a 1 percent increase in the Japanese R&D capital stock
contributes to raise the US output by 0.04 percent through trade flows and by
0,001 percent through the US outward FDI in the Japanese economy. The
mean <international’ impact of each country’s R&D capital stock is
illustrated in the last rows of table 3. A one percent increase in the US R&D
capital stock induces a 0.02 percent increase of foreign output through trade
flows and a 0.015 percent through outward FDI in the USA. For some
countries, the impact of other countries’ domestic R&D capital stock is
greater through the technology sourcing channel than through import flows.
This is particularly true for the effect of the US domestic R&D capital stock
which benefit most of the other industrialized countries (except Japan) more
15through their outward investments in the US boundaries than through their
imports from the USA.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We resorted mainly to Coe and Helpman’s database to replicate and extend
their analysis of international R&D spillovers. Our empirical findings may
be summarized as follows. (i) We provide a superior -both theoretically and
empirically- model of how the R&D performed by other countries tiects
domestic output and productivity via trade flows. (ii) Our re-examination
also suggest that some of the estimates presented by Coe and Helpman may
have been based on inappropriately-indexed data. (iii) Outward FDI flows
and import flows are two simultaneous charnels through which technology
spills over and benefits other industrialized countries. That is, while we
cotirm some of the empirical findings of Coe and Helpman about the role
of international trade flows in the process of technology transfer, we also
give credence to the hypothesis of technology sourcing associated with
MNEs’ activities abroad. Further, and contrary to the frequent conjectures,
inward FDI flows do not contribute to the improvement of the technological
base of the host economies.
16Appendix: Data sources and definitions
The total factor productivity index F comes from Coe and Helpman (1995,
table Al); it is defined as F = Y / [KP L(’-P)1 ,where Y is value-added in
the business sector, K is the stock of business sector capital, and L is
employment in the business sector. All variables are constructed as indices
with 1985=1. The coefficient ~ is the average share of capital income from
1987-89. See Coe and Helpman for a detailed description of the other data
sources.
The estimates of domestic business sector R&D capital stocks are described
in Coe and Helpman (p.878). We have reestimated the value of the
domestic MD capital stocks from the indices provided in table A.3 of Coe
and Helpman and the value of the stock in 1990, provided in their table A.7.
The domestic R&D capital stocks are in U.S. dollars, based on PPP’s and in
constant 1985 prices.
The three different foreign R&D capital stocks have been computed from the
domestic R4D capital stock of each country. The formulas tie presented in
the text. The GDP and the Gross Fixed Capital Formation for each country
comes from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators. For Israel, the GDP
data are from the ~’s Statistical Yearbook. Bilateral imports flows were
used for each year, from 1971 to 1990 based on data from the United
Nation’s International Trade Statistics Yearbooks (Coe and Helpman used
data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade). The ratios of the imports of goods
and services to GDP come from Coe and Helpman’s table A6 and are from
the IMF’s Direction of Trade. National total inward and outward Foreign
Direct Investments flows come from three OECD publications: Recent
17Trends in International Direct Investment (1981, 1987) and the
International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1993, In order to avoid
sharp yearly fluctuations, the series of inward and outward FDI flows have
been computed within a four years moving average framework (the average
of the present and the three preceding years). There are no complete time
series of bilateral inward FDI flows over the period 1970-90.
We have computed two bilateral inward FDI shares matrices (representing
for each country the distribution of inward FDI over the origin countries),
one for the 70’s and one for the 80’s from the available data provided by the
OECD publications during the two decades. We used these shares to
estimate the yearly bilateral inward FDI flows from the total inward FDI
flows described here above, From 1970 to 1975, the 70’s weighting matrix
has been used. From 1985 to 1990, the 80’s weighting matrix has been used.
For each year during the period 1975-1985, we assumed a constant yearly
rate of growth of each components from the weighting components of the
70’s matrix to the corresponding components of the 80’s matrix, Since these
weighting components have sometimes negative values, we have set all
negative values to zero, because the stock of foreign R4D may be zero but
not negative. The bilateral outward FDI flows are the transposed of the
bilateral inward FDI flows, for each country and each year.
18Table 1.
Total factor productivity estimation results -22 countries, 1971-90,
440 observations’
Coe and Helpm (1995) 2
E~lanatory variables m (1)010 .089 .134 .060 .600 ,046
indices, 1985=1
cfi. table 3, p, 869 (U)11O .078 .156 .294 .630 OU
This study
EW1anatory variables aa (iii)olo .0f16 .126 .058 .612 .050
indices, 1985= 1. (.009) (017) (.016)
(lV) 1 1 0 .078 .145 276 634 .04a
(.008) (.016) (.044)
Explanatory variables in (V)olo .612
levels (E) (Fn (Yq
(W)llo 103 144 .004 .600
(008) ( ol~ (.004)
(ti)ool .059 086 .109 .665
(.008) (elm ( 012)
(viii) o -1.241 1612 .044 086 049 .671





1. The dependent variable is log (total factor productivity), indexed m 1985=1. Unreported country
specific constants (within estimates). Standard errors in parentheses.
2. ‘fhe aut.hom do not report standard errors but note that all of them are one fourth (or less) smaller
than the estimated coefficients, which means fiat all parameters are si@lcantly dfierent from zero.
19Table 2,
Total factor productivity estimation results -13 Triad countries, 1971-90,
260 observations],
(1) (ii) (m) (N)
10s(s:) 089 049 017
( ::) (m) (.CQ8) (m)
10g(s~)*G7 .126 .192 097 .066









R2 acjusted 765 656 770 .823
Standard C~O[ .039 ,046 .638 034
1. me dependent variable is log (total factor productivity), indexed as 1985=1. Unreported country
specific constants (titbin estimates). Standard eITors between brackefi. Sd = domestic R&D capital
stock, mij is tie flows of imperia of country i from country j. yj is cOuntry j ‘SGDP, fij is tbe flOWS Of
FDI from country j to country i; ti, is the flows of FDI from country i to country j; kj is country j‘s
gross fixed capital formation, G7 = dummy variable equal to 1 for the G7 muntries md equal to
zero for the otbcr countries.
20Table 3
International output elasticities of domestic R&D capital stocks, 1971-90
Import news
GER FRA ffA UK EEL DK GRC IE NTH PT SP USA JM
GER 0172 .005S ,0178 W ,M09 W .0002 0188 .0001 .00Q4 ,0168 .0048
FRA .0278 .0066 ,0172 ,SQ93 ,0004 .~ .0002 ,0087 0001 ,W07 ,0172 .0030
ITA 0292 ,0203 .0124 W44 ,0005 .OMO .0001 ,0080 ,0001 0004 .0145 ,0019
UK 0230 .0127 .0034 .0052 .0012 ,0000 .M12 .0120 .W2 ,3005 ,0271 0053
EEL ,0250 .0163 0019 OIM ,~2 0000 ,0001 .0197 ~ ,2i302 ,0095 0016
DK .02~ .0059 .0020 .S1226 .0032 .0000 0001 .0080 OCQl .0002 ,0116 0033
GRC .0278 .0101 0070 .0130 .0032 .0005 owl .0084 m .0003 ,0097 0077
[E .0060 ~33 .O~ .0604 ,0011 .0002 .0000 ,0028 .0000 .3001 .0149 .W19
NTH .0315 .~7 .0019 .0160 .0116 .0004 .00M W2 ,0001 .0W2 .0161 ,SI021
P’f .0195 ,0134 ,0045 ,0218 0033 ,0004 .0000 0CU21 ,0063 0019 .0176 ,~32
SP ,0197 .0159 .0046 0169 .0025 .0003 0000 .0002 .W45 .0002 .0252 W40
USA 0158 0071 .0032 .0224 ,W21 .0004 0000 0002 .W32 ,0001 .0003 .0358
JAP 0070 .0034 .0011 .0065 W7 .0004 .MOO 0001 .W1O .0000 ml .0719
Oulward FDI flOWS









































































































































Average elmticiv of foreign output
Inlpo* 0156 .0084 .0032 0163 .M35 .0005 ~ .0002 0060 .0001 .3003 .0200 0170
Outward 0026 .0031 .0006 0186 0015 .0001 .W .0001 MIS .0000 .~2 .0146 0003
FD1
Ave@e elasticity of domestic output
.083 .0B3 .083 083 ,017 .017 ,0[7 .017 .017 .017 ,017 S183 .083
Estimated elasticity of output intbe row country with respect to the R&D capital stock in tbe
colurnJJ coun@. Based on regression (iv) of table 2 aod on equation (11). Averages are calculated
using GDP weigbti.
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